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Abstract:   
   In this study, an attempt is to figure out the institutional changes that initiate the agricultural 
commodity exchange (ACE). To assess the affecting factors, new institutional economics 
approach has been chosen. The framework consisting of four levels of social analysis 
introduced by Oliver E.Williamson is used to analyze the social environment, institutional 
rules, institutional arrangements and finally the agency level economics (Neo-classical 
economics). Regarding this framework, the institutional changes that have initiated the 
Iranian ACE is analyzed and its constraints to further improvement are discussed.    
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Introduction: 
As agreed by a majority of authors who have studied commodity exchange markets, the main 
objective of commodity exchange is to reduce the transaction costs of trade by gathering the 
sellers and buyers in a single place. In such environment competition would increase and an 
equilibrium price would be discovered. The price which is set up for a certain commodity is 
the true value of the good which has been brought up by the demand and amount of supply. 
Free and equal access to the market information causes a transparency in this type of markets. 
Besides, the standardization of commodities by market regulators (a third party) would 
decrease asymmetric situation considerably. In the case of well functioning, this approach of 
trade would reduce additional increase of commodity’s price to which it may be caused by the transaction costs. This situation is very close to the assumptions made by the neoclassical 
paradigm. Agricultural commodities exchange is more or less similar to other commodity 
exchanges except that not all agricultural products can be traded through this market. The 
tradable commodities are unified by several characteristics such as being mass, able to be 
standardized, ability to be stocked and low level of monopolization (i.e. highly competitive).    
In 1996, Iran has applied to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since then, political 
decisions toward approaching the requirements of WTO accession was taken by Iranian 
governments. Between adjustments of tariff barriers and industry supports, establishment of 
commodity exchanges have been also remarkable. Finally, in the 3rd five year development 
plan (FYDP), 1998-2003, Iranian parliament has approved that commodities exchange can be 
created with the same legal framework of stock exchange market (which has been established 
in 1967). In 1999, Iranian Agriculture Ministry has been recruited to set up the Iranian 
Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ACE) in collaboration with Iranian Stock Exchange 
Organization and Agricultural Bank. Finally in 2001, the first Iranian ACE has been launched 
with 4 crops in the province of Gorgan -a large producer of cereal and legumes. 
Despite the few years of Iranian ACE’s performance, scientists argue that it has failed to 
reach the objectives that have been defined for it (Chizari, 2004), (Sabagh Kermani & Azizi, 
2009). One of its objectives was to replace the role of state in organizing the agricultural trade 
market but the institutional environments have not altered in favour of this change (toward 
privatization). In this literature review the situation that has initiated the Iranian ACE would 
be assessed and the obstacles to its development would be listed.     
1.  Agricultural Commodity Exchange in the World;  
Historically, it is reported that forms of rice futures trading existed in China 6,000 years ago. 
Aristotle, in his book of Politics, described the use of option call on olive oil trade. But, the 
first organized future market was established in 1730 in Osaka, Japan on rice exchange. In the 
US, organized trading boards for maize and cotton future trade were set up in Chicago and 
New York respectively but with a low trading floor, till in 1856, when the new management 
decided to establish grades and standards as well as a nationwide price information system 
(extracted from the UNCTAD report, 2006)  
1.1 Cases in Latin America: 
Latin America’s largest and most important commodity exchange is the Bolsa de Mercadorias 
& Futuros (BM&F), in Brazil. In 1997 & 2003, it was ranked as the world’s 4
th and 11
th 
largest future exchange respectively. This fall in the international ranking was mainly caused 
by the Brazilian devaluation which impacted on trading volumes (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Agricultural contracts exchange, especially coffee (100 million US dollar worth of trade per 
month), counts for a big portion of trade hardly comparable with main commodity future 
markets in New York and Chicago.   Argentina has one of the world’s oldest agricultural commodities futures exchanges, the Bolsa 
de Cereales dating back to 1854. The Argentinean commodity exchange experienced 
fluctuations from time to time as the governmental regulations changed. Argentina is a 
country with a highly literate population (97.2% of adult literacy, 2001 census) and an export-
oriented agricultural sector.    
1.2 Cases in Western Europe (former communist countries) 
 
Several countries with economies in transition have domestically oriented futures exchanges.  
In Hungary, the Budapest Commodity Exchange (BCE), created in 1989, which trades in 
financial futures as well as grains and livestock, has been quite successful, ranking as the 
world’s 44th futures exchange in 2004  (UNCTAD, 2006). In Czech Republic, Romania, 
Bulgaria commodity exchanges have been created after the collapse of communism legacy 
(Since 1990) and they are mostly focused on organizing trade for immediate physical 
delivery.   
 
1.3 Cases in Africa 
 
The idea of Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ZIMACE) arose in the early 
1990s, when the government committed itself to liberalize agricultural marketing which was 
under parastatal control for years. It became apparent that an organization was needed 
through which free marketing of agricultural commodities could occur (Masanganise, 2002). 
The first stakeholders of this organization were two private companies of Commercial 
Farmers’ Organization and Edward & Co. Prices became market determined with the 
exception of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) that continued to set floor prices for 
commodities. 
Despite the constraints that smallholders face in trading through the ACE such as quantity 
offered, quality of produce and infrastructural shortcomings, since 2000 the government has 
embarked on massive land reform and resettlement exercise which has added more 
smallholder farmers. This institutional environment change in Zimbabwe has changed the 
institutional arrangements between brokers and smallholders. Since there are a number of 
conditions to trade through ZIMACE such as the volume of each transfer should be at least 5 
tons for cereals and oilseeds, some smallholders who choose to trade through ZIMACE would 
not benefit fully from the equilibrium prices for as Masanganise (2002) has identified that 
some brokers can buy commodities which could be sold to end users like millers without 
going through the Exchange. These deals will not give the farmer competitive prices.  
 
1.3 Iran 
The Iranian AEC today exchanges 10 agricultural commodities. Not all of the commodities 
have experienced a good trade through the ACE. As shown in the table 1, the biggest shares 
of exchanged contracts belong to corn and oil cakes, which both are used as livestock feeding.  
In between, barley has also a considerable exchange. These exchanges are mostly traded in 
















Share of total N° 
of contracts 
exchanged 
Rice 115  1819990  0,01%  157796  23  0,04% 
Barley 39025  1624515  2,40% 6943565  7805  12,15% 
Pistachios 0  307036  0,00%  0  0  0,00% 
Lentils 75  7813  0,96% 51067  15  0,02% 
Corn 149800 1231665  12,16%  30305603  29960  46,63% 
Sugar 245  ***      101684  49  0,08% 
Oil cake** 81910  ***     25384126  16382  25,50% 
Date 24500  507852  4,82%  3558333  9800  15,25% 
Tea 500  150483  0,33%  206278  100  0,16% 
Raisin 297,5  ***      239653 119  0,19% 
Total           66948105  64253  100,00% 
Notes:  * Iranian Rial currency has been transferred to US $ with a exchange rate of 
9000 Rials=1 US$ (Average of 2007) 
  **Solid residue of oil seeds (soybean, colza and sunflower) 
  ***Processed food that needs conversion rates for calculation, but national 
production of the primary products of these food are as following in tons; 
Soybeans: 83366, Colza:31205, Sunflower: 25777, Sugar Beats:5729105, 
Grapes:1415780  
Source:  Iranian AEC, section of research and development, National Annual Statistic 
book, and self calculations 
 
Iranian Ministry of Trade has made an agreement with the organization of commodities 
exchange and Ministry of Agriculture to trade the imported commodities in the ACE. So 
commodities such as corn, barley, oil cake are mostly those which have been imported from 
countries such as Brazil, Argentine, Canada and they are delivered in the Iranian southern 
ports (mainly Imam Khomeini Port). For other local products (mainly date, tea, raisin, tea, 
pistachios and rice) there are provincial ACEs where local traders trade through these 
markets. As it’s shown in the table 1 their share in the total exchange is considerably low 
(except for date).  
Iranian ACE has been established to solve some of the market imperfections which exist in 
the agricultural sector. In the 3
rd part of this study, we would mention and discuss a few main 
reasons which result in the low amount of exchange for local commodities. The analysis of 
the reasons is based on the institutional economics theory. Williamson (1998) has categorized 
the institutional economics into four levels, respectively from the first to the forth are; Social 
theory, institutional environment, institutional arrangement, Neo-classical economics. In the 
following (2
nd part) a theory of these institutional economics would be reviewed.    
2.    Reasons influencing the raise of ACEs: 2.1 Social Theory  
Trade rules and customs have been developed through centuries in different parts of the 
world. Almost everywhere in the world traces of spot markets can be found, places where 
suppliers and buyers gather and determine a price through bargaining. Social norms, 
traditions and religion have had effects on agreements and the way the trades took place. 
Sales through fairs, trading by instalments and contracts for future delivery are ways of 
marketing commodities which are continued till today without any changes or some changes 
have occurred along with the changes in social norms and technological improvements. These 
changes have tried to increase the security of exchanges. While in the past, trades were mostly 
based on individual trust, through time methods of enforcements have been established. When 
the size of a society grows to a certain size where buyers and sellers no longer know each 
other, they seek ways to decrease their uncertainty in trade. Milan Zafirofski (2003) called the 
former situation as “communication network” by where he cites from Granovetter (1985)  that 
according to the new economic socialogy, social relations are fundemental to market 
processes, and elaborates furhter that these relations imply a microstructural concept of 
markets where informal and interpersonal relations such as face to face contacts, ties and 
interactions are established among actors of the market. In the case of agricultural markets, 
ties are made between producers, traders and consumers. But as societies have grown in size 
and transportation has became cheaper, these ties have been to some extent broken when new 
producers and traders from other ragions have entered a certain market. This fact gradually 
brought up the need of some institutional arrangements that a third party would oversee the 
well functioning of the market. (further discussion would be left to the realative section, 2.3)      
 
2.2 Institutional Environment 
Williamson (1998) defines the institutional environment as a product of politics which 
provide the rules of the game within which economic activity is organized. The judiciary 
system, public laws and bureaucracy of administrative activities shape up the institutional 
environment of a society which make constraints for members of society not to pass the limits 
which would create disorders in the society. With the same concept we may conclude that 
Exchange Markets are launched by states with predefined rules to bring discipline to the 
trades that take place in society. Institutions have change and develop to cope with problems 
that the society is facing. For example, the uncertainty in time of delivery and products’ prices 
of trades between the agricultural producers and processing firms can be reduced by contract 
farming by the function of intermediates. Larger private traders and banks are in the best 
position to become these intermediaries (Verangis & Larson, 1996), but in order to avoid 
exploitation of farmers (in extreme terms, monopsony) and a fair trade to take place, a highly 
competitive market place is advised. As mentioned by a study, prepared by the UNCTAD, in 
economies which to a certain extent are disorganized and markets are imperfect, the presence 
of an exchange market can impose discipline on the commodity sector. This is where the role 
of governments comes through.  In most Central and South American countries the commodity exchange has been introduced 
after the liberalization of markets of 1992. Liberalization brings structural changes in market 
and producers use few approaches to mitigate the risk and hedge the price decline. Thus, the 
exchanges in Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela were created mostly as a mechanism for the 
organization of domestic agricultural trade flows (UNCTAD report, 2006). These markets 
were to create a discipline in trades to discover an equilibrium price for agricultural 
commodities through the supply and demand of private firms.  
But although these regulations are set by an authority, do they function in a same way in 
different societies which have their own institutional arrangements?  
2.3 Institutional Arrangements  
  The rules of the game have been already set up in the governmental level (institutional 
environment); this level deals with the play of the game (as named by Williamson, 1998). 
Institutional arrangements deal with the governance structure of an agent. Issues such as 
contracting and the transaction costs are discussed in this area.  
The regulatory structures of ACE which govern exchange markets concerning the accounting 
procedure, the organization of trading and clearing facilities are pre-specified and almost 
uniform worldwide, but as Merton and Bodie (1995) have revealed the way these markets are 
performed, may differ regarding the institutional arrangements of each country. Social norms 
would also influence the acceptance of traders and suppliers to take part into the ACE, either 
to contact through the market or continue to trade traditionally. 
As a focal point for trade in a sector, the concentration of buyers and sellers in one place 
reduces the transaction costs that would have been incurred in the search for a suitable 
counterparty (UNCTAD, 2006). Additional increases in a good’s price which may occur in 
other markets because of transaction costs are minimum in these markets. Bick (1982) and 
Damodaran & Subrahmanyam (1992) as cited by Tsetsekos & Varangis (1998), address the 
information content related to the ACE, and that ACE increase the liquidity, i.e.  assets would 
be converted with little change in their price. The time spent to gain information is decreased 
using digital casting in the markets. However, the amount of time that a trade may take to be 
accomplished would itself be accounted as a value added to the commodity. An estimated 
cost of time is taken into account at the time of future contracting. On the other hand, the 
longer a trade continues the more asymmetric information among the participants (Tsetsegog 
& Verangis, 1996). When a contract continues its length of time, price expectations increases 
and price deviations are common. To avoid these market failures, it is recommended by the 
mentioned authors to promote technology information and to impose more rigorous disclosure 
rules by the regulatory authorities.    
Contracts which are possible over the counter (OTC) of the ACE have the same concept of 
conventional contract farming. Generally, three types of contracts are common for 
agricultural commodities in ACE, which are; Forward, Future and Option. Such contracts convey the delivery of the goods to a future time. Although, immediate deliveries are also 
practiced in many countries and are also possible through repurchasing receipts of future 
contracts and receiving the stock from the warehouse.  
Although elimination of various intermediary chains in agricultural commodities markets will 
be risky for the incomes of the people involved, stabilization of incomes might be more 
beneficial for the traders (Kourmanova, et al, 2008). A well-functioning exchange acts as an 
"island of excellence", and can extend high levels of performance and integrity attained in its 
core functions to other areas of commodity-sector activity (UNCTAD, 2006).  The 
commodity exchange, beside the trading procedure, introduces a financing system where the 
financial institutes can provides credits to producers in an environment with a lower level of 
risk. As Tsetsegog and Verangis (1998) have revealed in their case study, derivatives 
exchange contribute to a development of financial infrastructure of a country by providing the 
links among cash markets, hedgers and speculators. The purchaser’s payment for a derivative 
is a source to provide credit to those producers who have delivered their good to commodity 
exchange. Here, their receipt of deliverance to the warehouse functions as collateral to a loan. 
2.4 Neo-Classical Economics  
Neo –classical economics analyzes the situation of the market from the point of view of an 
agent. In this school of thought, a firm is assumed to act rational, thus it chooses the best 
option to trade. The factors that an agent would take into account while decision making are 
the prices offered by the market, the amount of risk, and the transaction costs that he may 
encounter by trading through that market.  
It seems obvious that each individual would seek the best price to sell his products to gain 
higher benefits from the trade. If the prices traded in ACE are higher than spot market, it is 
expected that individuals would sell their produce in ACE. As it can be seen it table 2, for the 
coming cropping year (products mainly harvested in August) the guarantee prices are chosen 











Wheat  2 250  3050  2350 
Barely  1 650  2700  2063 
Maize  1 750  2760  2775 
Source: Iranian Ministry of Agriculture & Bahman Broker Company 
Primary products such as agricultural commodities are known as commodities which their 
prices have high and continuous fluctuations (Sabagh Kermani & Hosseini, 2004). The same 
authors know instability of agricultural commodities as one of the main reasons to build 
future markets as organized markets which cope with price risks.  
3.   Initiatives for Iranian Agricultural Commodity Exchange 
Why has Iranian ACE been started? Around the year 2000 what events, national or 
international, have happened that brought up the need to start an AEC in Iran? What were the 
Iranian government’s expectations from the ACE, and to what extent have they succeeded to 
reach their goals?  
Generally, three main advantages were considered by setting up and developing the ACE in 
Iran; improvement of economic structure, development of agricultural sector and 
improvement of export power (Sabagh Kermani, Azizi, 2005), (Chizari, 2004).   
3.1 To improve economic structure 
One of the main issues that threat the economic structure of Iranian agricultural sector, as 
mentioned by Sabagh Kermani & Azizi (2005) is that in the traditional market, producers’ 
necessity to credits are not considered where that, orients producers (especially smallholders) 
towards the intermediaries who provide credits. Contract farming arrangements tend to be 
characterized by an unbalanced power relationship (Bijnman, 2008). This may easily lead to 
exploitation of the powerless by the powerful (Little and Wattts, 1994, cited by Bijnman, 
2008). The contractors in Iranian agricultural sector decrease the agricultural activities’ 
potential profits by pre-purchasing the commodities for lower prices regarding the need of 
farmers in a certain time of the production period.  
Such social environment called the necessity to have an organized structure which would 
introduce new relations between agricultural sector’s actors. Obviously, in this new 
environment the actors in the traditional market can also be involved by complying with the 
rules of the game (Sabagh Kermani & Azizi, 2005). Iranian constitutions, judiciary laws and bureaucracy procedures (institutional environment) 
where favourable to establish commodity exchange as the Tehran Stock Exchange existed 
since 1967. Only 3 years has been taken from the date that it has been decided to establish the 
ACE (1998 in FYDP) till the date that it has formally started its activity (2001). This can be 
explained by the fact that all fundamental institutions that were required, even buildings and 
required technology, have already existed. This 3 year period was mostly dedicated to set up 
institutional arrangements specific to Commodity Exchanges, i.e. decide which products to be 
traded and setting the regulatory structures which govern exchange markets concerning the 
accounting procedure, the organization of trading and clearing facilities.  
To choose which commodity can be traded through the ACE studies have been implemented 
to assess the conditions of each specific produce. These studies assessed first of all 
information such as amount of national production and the portion which is imported or 
exported for each product category- legumes, cash crops, oil seeds and etc. Then 
characteristics of each commodity was assessed whether they are possible and beneficial to be 
traded through ACE. The characteristics which has been used as a criteria named in the 
studies of Chizari (2004), Sabagh Kermani & Azizi (2008) & Sabagh Kermani & Hosseini 
(2004) were the degree they are perishable (to measure the ability to be stocked), level of 
governmental monopolization and monopsony and the way it functions, price risk, ability to 
be standardized, value added to the national economy and their role in household 
consumption basket. 
It is worth to mention simultaneously to the ACE establishment, Metal and Petroleum 
Exchange have also been launched. These two other commodity markets are known to have 
more success than ACE. The reasons that were counted for this success were that the 
government obliged governmental manufactories of metal and petroleum industry to trade 
only through commodity exchange. But for agricultural commodities the Ministry of 
Agriculture has itself became a competitor of ACE by becoming the larger buyer in the 
country. 
Regarding the degree of governmental monopolization and monopsony for a product we may 
explain why trade of some of the commodities has not yet reached their optimum level. 
Iranian government, under its support policy, sets guarantee prices for all the crops that are 
traded through the ACE. It also purchases the produce through a governmental organization 
called “Rural Cooperation”. A high percentage of Iranian farmers sell their produce to state. 
For some commodities which are known as strategic, policies are made in a way to stimulate 
production. One of the supports that has been chosen is price support which are relatively 
high and can be in some cases as same as the market price (e.g. Wheat).  
There is a debate which argues that the state should sell the commodities purchased through 
the Rural Coops through ACE. Till today, the purchased commodities were kept in state 
warehouses and resold with a lower price either through coupons or to the governmental 
employees through consumers’ cooperatives. According to regulation 44 in Iranian constitution, governmental responsibility on different 
economic sectors should gradually be transferred to private sector if the country is self 
sufficient with educated experts in that particular field. It can be said that one of the initiatives 
of ACE was to move toward privatization. Although, it has been launched by the government 
but the brokers are mainly private institutes.   
3.2 To improve the export potency 
The third goal expected from ACE establishment in Iran is improvement of export power. 
This is expected to be achieved through standardization of products that are traded through 
the AEC. Stable and organized standards will lead to the production of products with quality 
standards able to compete in global market (Sabagh Kermani & Hosseini, 2008). Products are 
graded by ACE authorities according to their quality and size to be tradable even when the 
buyer doesn’t see them from close. Standardization by a third party reduces asymmetric 
situation and though reduces the transaction costs of remote contracts. On the other hand, 




Studying the procedure of ACE establishment in different parts of the world and their 
development, reveal that, ACE is a response to some economic requirements and its 
establishment is to bring a discipline to the national economy by its specific institutional 
arrangements. It can be said that in the recent decades with the collapse of state dominant 
economics in Western Europe, Latin America and some other countries around the world, 
Commodity Exchanges have been emerged to create competition and to reform the market 
structure and the distribution system. This is an accepted event and unavoidable necessity in 
most countries which have a transition from governmental economy to market based 
economy. 
As mentioned before, one of the characteristics of a commodity which is traded in ACE is to 
have low level of monopolization. In the case that states intervene in price establishing, either 
through setting guarantee prices or international trade barriers, expecting a well functioning 
ACE is far out of reach. 
In the case of Iran, it can be explained that the change in environmental institutions has 
emerged the establishment of ACE. Applying for WTO accession and regulation N° 44 are 
the two main ones. Despite this big institutional environment change, Iranian Ministry of 
Agriculture has not yet arranged new sets of policies that would coordinate with the changes 
and is functioning in parallel to ACE. When the guarantee prices set by the state are 
equivalent (in some cases even higher) to market prices, the best choice for most farmers is to 
sell their produce to state (especially smallholders). Finally, it is concluded that Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, who itself is one of the 
stakeholders of the Iranian ACE, needs to change its support policies in a way that would not 
disorganize the market competition.  References: 
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